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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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numbers of Polish children. The actual number was not defined, but it
was made clear that it was only to be the children of Polish blood. On
November 3, 1942, Ambassador Romer once more referred to the
evacuation; Molotov did not give a refusal, but emphasised that it must
be speeded up. Romer proposed that 19,000 children should leave
Russia, but Vyshinksy protested, stating that only the six hundred who
were already in Aschabad on the Caspian sea could go. Any further
discussion on this problem brought the same negative results.
On the Polish side, the events of the summer and autumn of 1942 in
Russia were to have an ever deepening echo. There had been the
greatest disappointment regarding the fate of the exiles. Many of the
soldiers of the newly-formed Polish Army had been forced to leave their
families on Soviet soil, and the knowledge that they would now be lost
forever, together with millions of their fellow-countrymen, caused the
greatest distress, and augmented the general sense of depression.
Sikorski, adhering to the principlec of maintaining the unity of the Allies,5
and hoping not to increase the friction, continued to minimise the strength
of the Soviet's blows against the cause of Poland. The Polish Press in
Britain and America, however, no longer concealed the seriousness of the
situation. It had already clamoured for the recall of Ambassador Kot,
and when he left Russia the Press queried whether, under the existing
circumstances another Ambassador should be sent before the matter had
been cleared up, or at least until the Soviets had given a guarantee with
regard to the remaining deportees. Since, as the Polish Press pointed
out, it seemed beyond the capabilities of the Polish Government to
improve the position, it became necessary to arouse the opinion of Britain
and America and bring the whole affair into the right perspective, par-
ticularly as Soviet propaganda was representing Poland to be the country
causing a rift in the c United Front of the Allies.'
In spite of the prevailing circumstances, Sikorski sent another Ambas-
sador, Tadeusz Romer. He was a stout champion of Sikorski's policy
of maintaining relations with Russia at any price. Romer brought Stalin
a letter from Sikorski, in which the latter once more appealed for good-
will and reminded him of the Declaration of Friendship of 1941.
Romer's position in the Soviet Union was not an enviable one. Anxious
to maintain the welfare organisation, he submitted a proposal for the crea-
tion of Polish-Russian control commissions as the link between the Em-
bassy and persons of trust among the exiles, to re-place the previously
existing delegates. In December, the Soviet Government declared at
first that it was prepared to accept this proposal, but finally the Narko-
mindel stated that the relief could be achieved only by " the Polish
Government paying cash into the Soviet treasury to help the Soviet
citizens of Polish origin; the Soviet Government would dispose of this
money and render an account."